TOPOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE

At the beginning of World War II the Services were confronted with the problem of planning for future operations in many parts of the world...they discovered suddenly that total war demands total intelligence. Unfortunately they also discovered that the files of data in the intelligence offices were woefully lacking in detailed information. The belief that war was impossible, or that America was safe and isolated; the omnipresent prejudice in this country against doing anything that does not appear to have immediate application; as well as general "economy" measures explain, in part at least, why we were caught so wholly and utterly unprepared. It is hoped that we have learned that our intelligence activities must be ever active--during peace as well as during war, I might say especially during peacetime. The need for strategic intelligence is immediate when conflict arises. Who would have thought, when Germany marched into Poland, that we should suddenly have to range our inquiries from the cryolite mines of Ivigut, Greenland to the guyule plants of Yucatan, Mexico; or from the twilight settlements of Kiska to the coral beaches of Guadalcanal. Who even thought we should be required to know (or indeed suspected that we did not know) everything about the beaches of France and the tides and currents of the English Channel.

The first year of the war saw a mad scramble in Washington to get "caught up". The service intelligence divisions set about the task of building up research staffs, collecting information, and publishing reports. But there was no stock of coherent intelligence to serve even as a basis for systematic research. Such data as were available were scattered among the files of many government agencies.

A Coordinator of Information was appointed by President Roosevelt in the person of General Donovan, but there was little information to coordinate so the Coordinator of Information also took up the task of collecting information

and Coordinator of Information became a research and collecting organization with its name changed to Office of Strategic Services (OSS). But there was still no coordinated research. Each agency, or even different sections within each agency, foraged independently and published reports independently. When topographic intelligence on a given area was called for at short notice, there ensued a wild scramble for any scrap of information from any source, often to the prejudice of security to say nothing of the shameful waste of manpower. Competition for source material sometimes resulted in agencies denying information to rival agencies though both were working toward the same end.

Duplicating and uncoordinated reports were written and published on many areas. In addition to many special reports, there were at least 4 major strategic intelligence publications: ONI Monographs, MID Strategic Intelligence Surveys, OSS Research and Analysis Intelligence Reports, and OCE Strategic Engineering Studies. Many of these were not completed in time to be used in planning of the operation. Each of the many studies had certain gaps in its information and many serious discrepancies came to light. (It is reported that President Roosevelt decided the United States should publish a Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Study at the Casablanca Conference (1/21/43)) At any rate it was shortly after this conference that

JOINT INTELLIGENCE STUDY PUBLISHING BOARD.

For this reason, General Strong (G-2), Admiral Train (ONI), and General Donovan (OSS) decided that some joint effort should be substituted for the then existing duplicating publications. A steering committee composed of Col. Joseph Evans (G-2), Lt. Col. Richard Cutts (ONI) and ▮▮▮▮▮▮ (OSS) was appointed. This committee recommended formation of the Joint Intelligence Study Publishing Board to consist of a member each from G-2, ONI, and OSS.

This Board is charged with "the duties of coordinating, supervising, editing, and promulgating Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies" (JANIS).

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These studies were to replace the ONI Monographs, MID Strategic Surveys and the OSS R and A Reports.

The mission of JANIS as set forth in its basic directive is"to make available one publication containing all the necessary detailed information upon which may be based a war plan for Military and Naval operations in a given area".

The original JISPB consisted of three officers only: one each from ONI, G-2, and OSS. These officers plus a secretary, a WAVE ensign and a cartographer edited and produced the first JANIS. This study was accepted by the Joint Intelligence Committee as superior to any previously produced study and the JISPB was implemented by an increase in its staff and the addition of an A-2 member and later an OCE member to the Board.

Coordination of strategic topographic intelligence next became international. By informal agreement JISPB was given major responsibility to produce studies in the Pacific Theater.

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As now constituted, JISPB receives its directives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Intelligence Committee, through the Joint Topographic Subcommittee. Manuscript for JANIS is prepared in some twenty (20) agencies of the United States Government. Effort has been made to enlist the services of the most expert sources available. The following outline gives the chapters of JANIS and the present contributing agencies:

Chapter II Military Geography - Topographic Branch, MIS

Chapter III Oceanography - Hydrographic Office and Coast and Geodedic Survey.

Chapter IV Coasts & Landing Beaches - Strategic Studies Section, ONI and
Beach Erosion Board OCE.

Chapter V Climate and Weather - Weather Division AAF, Aerology Section, Navy -
and Weather Bureau.

Chapter VI Ports and Shipping - Rivers and Harbors Board OCE
Geographical Desks of Foreign Branch ONI

Chapter VII   Transportation and Telecommunications - Intelligence Section,

OCE and Signal Corps

Chapter VIII   Cities and Towns - Intelligence Section OCE.

Chapter IX   Resources and Trade

Industries - Political Economic Board, MID

Electrical Power - Intelligence Section OCE

Agriculture - Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Agric.

Construction and Raw Materials, Water Supply - USGS

Finance - Federal Reserve Bank

Trade - Office of Foreign & Domestic Commerce - Commerce.

Chapter X   People and Government - State

Chapter XI   Health & Sanitation - Surgeon General's Office

Chapter XII   Aviation - A-2

Chapter XIII   Gazetteer & Map Evaluation - Board on Geographical Names

Army Map Service and Map Intelligence

Div. State

Operating Procedure

The priority list for Joint Intelligence Studies originates with the
Joint Intelligence Committee, the Joint War Planners or Joint Logestic Planners.
The Joint Topographical Subcommittee then determines the capability of the
contributing agencies to meet the schedule and issues deadline dates to JISPB
for completion of studies. The JISPB adapts the outline guides to the area,
produces a basic outline map and instructions for the contributing agencies.
Considerable attention is given to planning and outlining each JANIS and in
preparing directions for the contributors. A map is carefully selected which
serves as a uniform base for all general maps in the study.

When the individual chapters or topics have been written, the manu-
scripts are sent to the JISPB for editing, coordination, and printing. JANIS
editors carefully check one chapter against another to remove duplicating
data and to be sure that the study is free from conflicting statements.
When a statement in one chapter conflicts with information given in another

chapter, the editors call in the contributors concerned and the conflicting statements are reconciled. Critical editing involves not only resolving conflicts in information and avoiding duplication but also in pointing up the material to give proper emphasis and in cutting down verbosity. All these functions are highly important and are a regular part of JANIS techniques. Particular attention is paid to making text and maps agree and numerous corrections are made in maps as well as in text before final printing.

Liaison and Coordination

In a Joint enterprise such as JANIS, liaison and coordination are all important. Experience has shown that few intelligence activities in Washington take the trouble to find out what other agencies are doing or even what material *these agencies may* they have in files and libraries. Chapter editors and others of the JANIS staff *of all available data* are in constant consultation with contributors to insure close check, Speed of production and press of work has prevented as much liaison and coordination as is desired. One of the great obstacles of the past -- the unwillingness of one agency to give information to another is rapidly being improved, *but* Such inter-agency jealousy has made the task of producing JANIS more difficult than it should be. By and large, however, whenever information is desired for JANIS, it is made available. In the process of cooperation all agencies learn from each other and each agency discovers that the true spirit of research pays dividends.

Dissemination of JANIS

During the war 2500 copies of each JANIS were produced. These were distributed by G-2, ONI, A-2, OSS, and OCE to staff and theater organizations as well as to some civilian organizations engaged in the war effort. The present printing schedule is 1100 copies and the Department of State receives the former OSS allotment. Much interest has been expressed in JANIS by agencies of the departments of Interior, Commerce, Agriculture and others. If classification could be lowered, the demand would be greatly increased.

All evidence points to success of JANIS. Some 20 studies were prepared during the war (at a ratio of one study each month). Numerous letters of commendation have been received both from the field and from staff planners. All agree that the JANIS program should be continued as a peace-time activity.

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